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Abstract: Michel Foucault is well-known for his theorizations of
institutional power, normativity, and biopolitics. Less well-known
was the fact that Foucault developed his analysis of biopolitics in and
through his historical investigation of neoliberalism. While critique
of neoliberalism has today become a commonplace of humanities
discourse and popular resistance to neoliberalization proliferates
globally, it remains unclear that the historical specificity of
neoliberalism is widely understood. In particular, the distinction
between classical liberalism and neoliberal governance tends to
dissolve in popular discourse. This paper followed Foucault in tracing
the historical emergence of neoliberalism from the classical
liberalism of the eighteenth century, attending to the continuities, as
well as the radical discontinuities between these political forms.
Particular attention was given to the history of neoliberalism in its
German and American variants. Because neoliberalism characterized
the governmental and economic reason and practice of late modernity,
recalling Foucault’s analysis prepared us to understand and engage
the social, political, and economic conjunctures reverberating
throughout the world today.

Keywords: Foucault, neoliberalism, political economy
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Introduction
Michel Foucault dedicated his 1977-1978 lectures at the
Collège de France to the genealogy of modern governmental reason
and practice. In these lectures, Foucault famously used the term
“governmentality” to broadly define methods of governance,
administration, and direction, as well as the formations of knowledge
which

render

governing

possible

(Foucault

2009:109).

Governmentality names a network of discourses and practices; these
may have fostered the productive and quasi-scientific administrative
management of population, which Foucault termed “biopolitics,” or
more explicitly coercive and repressive modalities of power (Foucault
2010:22). From 1978-1979, Foucault pivoted his focus to the
contemporary world, analyzing a neoliberal governmentality first
articulated in the 1930s and developed in Europe and the United
States through the postwar period. Foucault was often remembered
for his theorization of “bio-power,” or those forms of governance and
administration which grasp populations and manage individuals
insofar as they are living beings (Foucault 1978:144). Yet it was often
forgotten that Foucault developed his analysis of biopolitics in and
through his historical investigation of neoliberal government and the
mechanisms of security which sustain it. In addition to illuminating
the political landscape of our contemporary world, recalling
Foucault’s lectures on neoliberalism shed significant light on more
well-known aspects of his philosophical legacy.
Today, critique of neoliberalism has become a staple of
humanities discourse, and popular resistance to neoliberalization
6

proliferates globally.1 However, it remained unclear that the historical
specificity of neoliberalism was widely understood; in particular, the
distinction between classical liberalism and neoliberal governance
has a tendency to dissolve in popular discourse. As a result,
neoliberalism was widely misconstrued as a simple extension of the
free market. Foucault’s landmark analysis destabilized this view,
demonstrating that neoliberalism was irreducible to an augmented
liberalism appropriate to the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries: it was something more. This paper followed Foucault in
tracing the historical emergence of neoliberalism from the classical
liberalism of the eighteenth century, attending to the continuities, as
well as the radical discontinuities between these political forms.
Beginning with a detailed exposition of Foucault’s analysis of
eighteenth-century liberalism and its emergence from earlier
formations of state politics, I charted Foucault’s genealogy of
neoliberalism in its early (German) and later (American) variants.
Because neoliberalism characterized the governmental and economic
reason and practice of late-modernity, Foucault’s analysis prepared

1

See, e.g., Brown, Wendy, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution
(2017); Harcourt, Bernard, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of
Natural Order (2011); or the 2013 special edition of SocialText, “Genres of
Neoliberalism.” Examples of global popular resistance are numerous. If the
privatization of public goods represents a constitutive feature of neoliberalism, then the
2018 struggle against education privatization in Puerto Rico may serve as one example
of such resistance. Likewise, the movement against prison privatization in the United
States can fruitfully be viewed through the prism of resistance to neoliberalism: see,
e.g., Wang, Jackie, Carceral Capitalism (2018).
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us to understand and engage the social, political, and economic
conjunctures reverberating throughout the world today.
1. The Emergence of a Liberal Governmentality
To contextualize a discussion of neoliberalism, it was worth
considering, first, the historical conditions under which liberalism
emerged, as well as the formations of governmental practice which
preceded it. First, a provisional and rather general definition of
liberalism may help orient the reader. Liberalism tended to define
individuals as rights-bearing subjects who are formally equal before
the law. Often, liberal sovereignty was understood to emanate from
the governed themselves, hence some form of democratic politics
commonly accompanied a liberal state. Perhaps more pertinent to the
present investigation, liberalism implied an economic order which
presupposed the irreducibility or naturalness of relations of private
property ownership. Such relations assumed their meaning and
import in a marketplace unencumbered by external elements, for
instance the state. In the market, the law of equal exchange
preponderated. While the organizational and conceptual features of
liberalism will be analyzed in greater detail in the following section,
here I examined the conditions of liberalism’s historical emergence.
The mid-eighteenth century saw a new formation of liberal
government beginning to take shape against the backdrop of a rigid
police state which had been erected throughout Europe from the
sixteenth through the eighteenth century. In the police states which
dominated early modern Europe, sovereign power was exercised in
8

the form of direct intervention at every level of the economy. Policy
emphasized favorable competition between states, which was
achieved through the attenuation of imperial objectives in the
international sphere, counterbalanced by a domestic policy of near
total control over production, circulation, and the conduct of citizens
in general. As the dream of a single, absolutely dominant empire
receded, European states began to acknowledge that economic
competition must be kept within reasonable limits to maintain
international stability. A legalistic sovereignty of command,
mercantilist economic policy, an ethos of European balance in
international trade and relations, and a domestic police state: such
were the general characteristics of the formations of governmental
reason and practice which proliferated in Europe from the sixteenth
to the eighteenth century, on Foucault’s account.
The emergence of a science of political economy in the late
eighteenth century formed a substantive development in the transition
which swept away previous formations of raison d’état, ushering in a
distinctively liberal governmentality. While continuing to emphasize
favorable inter-state competition, political economy opened a
discursive space in which governmental practice could no longer take
the shape of unchecked edict, fiat, and command. Approaching the
market as a set of “phenomena, processes, and regularities” which
occurred naturally and intelligibly, and which could be hampered or
allowed to unfold unimpeded by governmental practices, classical
political economy unearthed “a certain naturalness specific to the
practice of government itself” (Foucault 2010:15). Henceforth,
9

governmental practices could be successes or failures vis-a-vis the
natural phenomena and dynamics which were their objects. Like all
others, the sovereign was subject to the natural laws which reign in
the market.
Broadly, eighteenth century political economy asserted that
natural market mechanisms, left to their own devices, would produce
a “true” price: a price which accurately demonstrated the
“relationship between the cost of production and the extent of demand”
(Foucault 2010:30). According to Foucault, a new “regime of truth”
was opened, wherein the market acted as a “site of veridiction” for
governmental practice (Foucault 2010:18, 32). Governmental
practice could be evaluated correlative to the market and deemed
inapt if it disrupted the production of true prices. Thus, a matrix of
success and failure supplanted a juridical matrix of sovereign
command in governmental practice. In light of the revelations of
political economy, which indicated that the economic field required
limited intervention, the sixteenth and seventeenth century police
states were gradually replaced by a governmentality whose
fundamental principle was that of the “self-limitation of government”
(Foucault 2010:19).
2. The Art of Least Possible Government
Understanding the conditions of liberalism’s emergence
prepares us to understand what was historically unique about a liberal
political order. Earlier formations of raison d’état had addressed
themselves to the question of how best to organize and govern a state,
10

or how to institute and elaborate a regime of governance which would
be dense, rigid, and more or less total. The scientific revelations of
eighteenth-century political economy, however, called for limited
intervention in the natural production of true prices. A liberal
governmentality was born, which understood itself in terms of a new
network of questions: how little can one govern? where is
governmental intervention necessary? where can it be abandoned? In
the formulation of these questions by political economists, and the
responses offered by jurists, advisors, reformers and revolutionists,
one can discern the emergence of an unprecedented liberal
governmentality, or what Foucault calls “the art of the least possible
government” (Foucault 2010:28).
Throughout the period of early liberalization, calls for the
curtailment of government intervention came from several angles.
Diverse justifications were employed. Today, a particular tendency is
emphasized in the narration of liberalism; liberal government is most
often understood in terms of the irreducibility of human freedom, the
necessity of political emancipation and organization on the basis of
natural rights, in short, a whole liberalistic theory of human nature.
Not controversially, Foucault linked this tendency to the thought of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a great humanist and a champion of
eighteenth-century political liberalism. Against the Rousseauist
tendency, Foucault distinguished those calls for limited government
which issued, not from the mouths of humanist revolutionists and
reformers, but from the scientific revelations of political economy.
These, he argues, have had the most consequential and enduring
11

political effects, and bear the most forcefully on our modernity.
Foucault organized his analysis around three key conceptual
innovations which undergirded the sort of liberalization demanded by
political economy. These concepts, which this section addressed in
turn, are the market, utility, and the principle of collective enrichment.
The classical political economists of the eighteenth century
argued that the market must be allowed to function according to the
natural laws by which it was governed. Such a natural order demands
an ethos of minimum governmental intervention. Doubtless, many
observations could be made concerning the diverse currents in
eighteenth-century thought which coincided with this view: the
apprehension of a certain naturalness which could be understood but
could not be subjected to an alien authority, the development of the
human sciences and natural history, deism, or the reinterpretation of
god as a transcendent being who, for all that, did not intervene in the
world human affairs. Liberalism, as Foucault saw it, developed as the
governmental rationality suitable to such a world: a new
governmentality whose principle was its own self-limitation,
observing the dictates of the market forces unearthed by the science
of political economy.
If classical economy could be said to organize itself around
a single concept or principle, it was doubtless exchange. As Foucault
noted, the market was here defined by “free exchange between two
[parties] who through this exchange establish the equivalence of two
values” (Foucault 2010:118). That was to say, in classical economy,
two values were determined to be equivalent insofar as they could be
12

exchanged for one another by free actors in a market unencumbered
by external forces. On this view, the state should not intervene in the
market or the process of exchange, except to guarantee that the
freedom of both parties to exchange value for value was respected.
The state’s principle role, then, was not within the market as a site of
exchange, but rather outside the market, at the site of production: the
state provided the institutional framework which guaranteed the
“necessity of private property for production” (Foucault 2010:118).
The market itself was governed by natural laws of equivalent
exchange, was defined as a space of freedom, and must be uninhibited
by governmental practice.
In the mid-eighteenth century, two general models existed
for establishing and fixing the limits of the art of least possible
government. As we have seen, Rousseauism sought to define the
natural rights of political subjects and analyze the social contract by
means of which some rights are transferred to the sovereign and
others are deemed inalienable. Such an analysis would determine the
maximum limit of acceptable governmental intrusion into the
individual affairs of political subjects. Beyond this limit, power would
be illegitimate. Against the Rousseauist tendency, Foucault
distinguished a utilitarian project, which was liked more closely in his
view to the demands of classical economy. Utilitarianism endeavors
to determine where government must apply itself; when; in what
manner; and to what extent. Where was government useful?
Conversely, utility will determine where governmental intervention
was ineffective, detrimental, or useless. Such analysis determined the
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minimum limit of necessary government, directing government to its
most useful points of application, while “continually questioning
government […] as to its utility or non-utility” (Foucault 2010:41).
The principle of utility in governmental practice, informed
by reflection and analysis of the market, dictates that government
limit its action not out of “respect for the freedom of individuals,” but
rather based on the “evidence of economic analysis which it knows
has to be respected” (Foucault 2010:62). In Foucault’s view,
utilitarianism has “stood fast” while Rousseauism has “receded”
(Foucault 2010:43). Despite the fact that Rousseauist avowals of
human liberty remained a persistent feature of the dominant political
narrative in the neoliberal period, it was the utilitarian, rather than the
Rousseauist tendency of classical liberalism which formed a key
element in the genealogy of neoliberal government, according to
Foucault. Indeed, as the fourth section of this paper will illustrate,
economic calculation and evaluation continued to dictate government
intervention and non-intervention in the contemporary neoliberal
state.
Alongside the principle of the market and the principle of
utility, Foucault emphasized a principle of collective enrichment
characteristic of classical political economy. Prior to the emergence
of liberalism, mercantilist economic analysis had figured economic
activity in a zero-sum manner. On this view, one actor’s enrichment
was necessarily realized at another’s expense, and economic activity
can in no way maximize the wealth of all parties. Classical
economists, on the other hand, argued that in a marketplace based on
14

free exchange, all parties benefit through the pursuit of their own
interests, when they exchange value for value, thereby establishing
equivalence. Because each party freely exchanged something of less
for something of greater utility, all parties to exchange are
beneficiaries. In a like manner, Foucault argued that “Europe as a
collective subject” emerges in economic reflection in the late
eighteenth century, as classical economists projected that Europe
would become rich “en bloc” through the mechanism of competition
between states, which maximizes utility for all (Foucault 2010:54).
Where mercantilism suggested protectionist, economics based on an
insulated national economy, classical economists stressed free trade
as a vehicle for collective enrichment.2
3. Administering Liberalism
Liberalism emerged in response to the revelations of
political economy, instituting a general laissez-faire policy as
concerns the market. And yet, despite this laissez-faire policy,
Foucault rejected the view that liberalism constitutes a regime in
which subjects enjoy quantitatively more or less freedom than they
do or did under other organizations of power. For Foucault, to adopt
this view would be to treat something abstract and relative—
freedom—as if it were a quantifiable absolute. It was Foucault’s view

2

It is evident that the classical stress laid on free trade persists to this day, and in general
remains an important feature of the neoliberal order. Interestingly, some commentators
have noted that the recent resurgence of nationalist, protectionist international
economic policy gestures towards a return to the outmoded views of the mercantilists
(Nelson 2019).
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that liberalism constitutes itself through a “productive/destructive
relationship [with] freedom” (Foucault 2010:64). To be sure,
liberalism required certain conditions of freedom to be met: those of
the market, exchange, etc. Yet in circumscribing the field in which
such freedoms could obtain, a liberal governmentality must establish
“limitations, controls, forms of coercion and obligation” which fix the
limits of freedom (Foucault 2010:64). Hence, liberalism could be said
to both “produce” and “consume” freedom. (Foucault 2010:63, 65).
Rather than being “a given […] which has to be respected,” Foucault
argued that we should understand freedom as the necessary minimum
condition which must be produced and sustained in order for
liberalism to function (Foucault 2010:65). Political liberties were not
natural facts or pre-political givens which governmental practice was
tasked to observe. Rather, such liberties were “object-effects” of a
given arrangement of discourses and practices instituted under
liberalism and sustained through its elaboration (Foucault 1979:305).
More concretely, it was evident that the institution of a
market economy whose principle is free exchange required the
preservation of the collective interest against the corrosive impacts of
the interests of individuals, while on the other hand the interests of
individuals must be left relatively unencumbered, such that market
mechanisms can function in a natural way. Liberal governmentality
thus exhibited a bipolar character, tending on the one hand towards
collectivist tyranny, and on the other towards anarchic individualism.
The conditions of freedom which were requisite to the liberal order
required constant supervision, maintenance, readjustment, and
16

organization. This lead Foucault to conclude that, rather than
instituting a regime of increased freedom in an abstract sense,
liberalism represented a transition from the police state to the security
state.
In Security, Territory, Population (2009), Foucault
juxtaposed apparatuses of security to juridical institutions and
disciplinary regimes. Juridical institutions addressed subjects with
legal commands and interdictions in a formal, linear relay topped by
a central authority or sovereign. Disciplinary regimes managed
individuals at the level of the body, through a diffuse yet rigid “microphysics of power” invested in networked institutions such as prisons,
schools, and hospitals (Foucault 1979:26). Security apparatuses, on
the other hand, are directed towards the collection of statistical data
concerning population and natural phenomena, and the use of such
data towards the implementation and refinement of programs
intended to manage and direct general forces to produce optimal
outcomes. Security apparatuses measure probabilities, calculate cost,
risk, and benefit, establish averages and set the limits of acceptable
excess, rather than focusing on meticulous or rigid control.
Security measures may be difficult to recognize as such, for
the very reason that they constituted the overall fabric of government
and administration to which we were accustomed. Foucault’s project
hinged on revealing this fact in its radical historical particularity.
Security has not always operated as the dominant mode of
government: it emerged in large part with the eighteenth-century art
of least possible government. Security apparatuses managed the
17

economy of freedom instituted in the liberal order. Foucault specified:
“the problem of security is the protection of the collective interest
against individual interests,” and vice versa (Foucault 2010:65). The
economy of power instituted under liberalism was a site of constant
play between the freedoms required for liberalism’s operation and the
management of risks which attend those freedoms. Such management
cannot be rigid and total, but must remain flexible and probabilistic.
It was the task par excellence of security. Notably, security
apparatuses continued to organize the neoliberal governmentality of
the present.
The institution and maintenance of security apparatuses,
disciplinary techniques, and juridical institutions, all of which were
required in some measure for liberalism’s optimal performance,
demanded a “culture of danger” to proliferate within a liberal regime:
individuals were “conditioned to experience their situation, their life,
their present, and their future as containing danger” (Foucault
2010:66f). In Foucault’s view, the production and manipulation of
fear was a precondition of the liberal order, or its “internal
psychological and cultural correlative” (Foucault 2010:67). Only
when faced with constant and multiple risks will subjects conditioned
to esteem freedom accept the curtailments of freedom which
liberalism paradoxically required. Producing certain freedoms while
maintaining others at an optimal level, countervailing their attendant
risks and justifying their consumption: such are the complex tasks of
liberal governmentality.
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Doubtless, one could emphasize other features of liberalism
than those highlighted by Foucault. His analysis was not intended to
be exhaustive. Rather, following a “genealogical” protocol, he
highlighted specific features of classical liberalism which bear on
contemporary regimes of governmentality, illuminating lines of
continuity and discontinuity between liberal and neoliberal
arrangements of political and economic discourse and practice
(Foucault 1984:76). Insofar as it formed a link in the genealogy of
neoliberal government, classical liberalism was a formation of power
and knowledge which analyzed its programs in terms of their utility
rather than their legitimacy, where utility was verified through effects
on a market whose principle was exchange and whose requisite was
limited intervention. Liberalism approached exchange as a vehicle for
collective enrichment, a principle which holds for inter-state
competition in the context of a world market. It produced and
consumed freedom, that is, it instituted and arranged an economy of
liberties, organizing this economy through apparatuses of security
and a culture of danger augmented by discipline and surveillance.
Strikingly prescient in today’s political landscape, Foucault’s remarks
remind us that, if the neoliberal era was in fact distinct from the epoch
of classical liberalism, certain elements of a liberal governmentality
remained persistent features of the neoliberal order.
4. Neoliberalism
The emergence and development of a complex social
formation such as neoliberalism could not be reduced to a unilinear
19

narrative of “progress” (Foucault 1984:85). Its line of descent was
fractured and multiple, combining an array of antecedent forces in a
novel way. Nor was neoliberalism itself homogenous, as if it emerged
in a single gesture, fully formed. Foucault’s genealogy distinguished
between two major variants in neoliberalism. The first arose in
Germany during the period of post-World War II reconstruction and
developed through a critique of National Socialist economic and
social policy. The second, American variant of neoliberalism defined
itself in reaction to New Deal interventionism implemented in the
wake of the Great Depression. While both tendencies reflected a
reaction against interventionist economic policy, there were
important historical and conceptual distinctions to be made between
German and American neoliberalism. This section reconstructed
Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism in its German and American
forms, emphasizing those features of neoliberal governmentality
which bear most forcefully on our historical present.
4.1. German Neoliberalism
In the wake of World War II, many European states were
employing Keynesian economic policies. An eminent twentiethcentury British economist, John Maynard Keynes advocated for
government intervention, specifically active fiscal and monetary
policies, to help mitigate the deleterious effects of recession and
inflation. Needless to say, interventions of the sort proposed by
Keynes seriously contradicted the liberal ethos of minimal economic
intervention. According to Foucault, the Keynesian interventionism
20

implemented in postwar Germany had three general objectives:
infrastructural reconstruction, economic stabilization via planning,
and social objectives considered “indispensable in order to avoid the
renewal of fascism and Nazism” (Foucault 2010:80). German
neoliberalism arose in reaction to Keynesian intervention, which was
seen by German neoliberals as symptomatic of the very forces which
had produced National Socialism.
The general social and economic causes of the Third Reich’s
rise were topics of unparalleled intellectual import in postwar
Germany. Foucault located the intellectual fountainhead of German
neoliberalism in the Freiburg School, where economists endeavored
to resolve—within the framework of capitalist production—the
“irrational rationality of capitalism” (Foucault 2010:105). This
economic irrationality, it was feared, had social consequences that
may have contributed to the rise of the Third Reich. According to the
Freiburg School economists, the economic policy of the Third Reich
represented the consolidation of numerous undesirable elements
culled from Germany’s modern history; it brought together
“protectionist economics, the economics of state aid, the planned
economy, and Keynesian economics” (Foucault 2010:109). Because
they contradicted the basic premises of a free market, these policies
rendered irrational the rationality of a free market. Further, if these
economic elements had ushered in the Third Reich, then their utter
liquidation, and not their re-implementation in the interest of
reconstruction, would be required to prevent the re-emergence of
fascism.
21

The birth of German neoliberalism in Freiburg could be
counterposed to simultaneous attempts by Western Marxists to
challenge the basic logic of capital and its accumulation. Such efforts
were exemplified by critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, whose
work frequently gesture towards social, cultural, and aesthetic
subversion of capitalist relations, emphasizing the pervasive and
injurious

effects

of

Enlightenment

“instrumental

reason”

(Horkheimer and Adorno 2001:237). The German neoliberals, on the
other hand, endeavored to redefine and buttress the economic
rationality of capitalist production, while avoiding the social
irrationality which had surged under National Socialism. They
accepted some key elements of the Western Marxist critique of a
consumer society composed of alienated, atomized individuals, yet
they typically view this polemic as misdirected. Where critical theory
attributed the virulent “leveling” of the social fabric to the corrosive
impacts of capitalism, the neoliberals of the Freiburg School
attributed the same afflictions to illiberalism and a society which “has
chosen a policy of protectionism and planning in which the market
does not perform its function and in which the state […] takes
responsibility for the everyday life of individuals” (Horkheimer and
Adorno 2001:9; Foucault 2010:114). For the Freiburg School
neoliberals, the social irrationality which spawned the Third Reich
could be attributed to the dominant role played by the state, where
critical theory found in the same irrationality only the evidence of
capitalist exploitation and abstraction.
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For the neoliberals of the Freiburg School, National
Socialism should not be misconstrued as the apotheosis of
Enlightenment instrumental reason, nor as an exaggeration of the
general social form assumed by late capitalism. Rather, National
Socialism offered a vivid illustration of the natural link between the
economic antecedents it combined: protectionist economics, the
economics of state aid, the planned economy, and Keynesianism.
According to Foucault, the “coup de force” of the Freiburg school is
the notion that each of these economic strategies are “linked to each
other[,] and if you adopt one of them you will not escape the other
three” (Foucault 2010:110). The Freiburg School effectively drew an
internal link between any sort of interventionist policy whatsoever
and National Socialism. The conclusion naturally drawn by the
German neoliberals was to abandon economic intervention in all its
forms.
As the German state attempted to reconstitute itself in the
wake of the Third Reich, neoliberal advising led the nascent West
German Republic to ground its sovereignty in the voluntary attraction
of economic subjects to an institutional framework which guaranteed
a space of economic freedom, i.e., a free market. This was, in
Foucault’s words, the “legitimizing foundation of the state on the
guaranteed exercise of an economic freedom” (Foucault 2010:82f).
By accepting the legitimacy and desirability of the particular sort of
economic freedom guaranteed by the state, economic subjects
“produce a […] political consensus” concerning the state itself
(Foucault 2010:85). If this is so, then favorable economic
23

performance—evidenced in a strong currency and a favorable rate of
growth—became an indicator of the legitimacy and good governance
of the state. In postwar Germany, then, “the economy produces
political signs that enable the structures, mechanisms, and
justifications of power to function” (Foucault 2010:85). The German
neoliberal state was, according to Foucault, a “radically economic”
state: its sovereignty is founded upon the consensus of subjects to
participate in a space of freedom opened by the economic institution
of the market (Foucault 2010:86).
Clearly, this neoliberal formation diverged sharply from a
Rousseauist political liberalism founded upon the assertion of natural
rights and the primacy of human liberty. Rather than sovereignty
emanating from a social contract among the governed, in postwar
Germany the economy itself “produces sovereignty,” that is, “the
economy produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor”
(Foucault 2010:84). Classical political liberalism began with a
legitimate state and endeavored to produce a space of economic
freedom therefrom. German neoliberalism, on the other hand, founds
the state as the guarantor of a space of economic freedom. German
neoliberalism was opposed to classical liberalism, then, insofar as the
neoliberal state followed from the free market, rather than the free
market following from the legitimate state. Because economic
indicators authorized state sovereignty in this neoliberal order,
Foucault could rightly remark that the neoliberal state is a “state under
the supervision of the market, rather than a market supervised by the
state” (Foucault 2010:116).
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If the neoliberal state found itself under the market’s
supervision, it must also be noted that the basic principle of the market
under neoliberalism was not that of the classical economists. As we
have seen, classical economy theorized the market as a space of
exchange defined by equivalence. Under neoliberalism, the market’s
basic principle was not equivalent exchange, but competition. This
pivot from exchange to competition constituted a radical
discontinuity between classical and neoliberalism. Yet, as Foucault
noted, this shift was not a novelty of the twentieth century. It was
traceable to the nineteenth, constituting an important channel in
neoliberalism’s genealogy. In the nineteenth century, liberal
economists had already begun to figure the market as a site of
competition, a space ruled “not [by] equivalency [as in a market based
on exchange] but on the contrary inequality” (Foucault 2010:119). It
was competition, and not exchange, which guaranteed economic
rationality, insofar as competition itself conditions exchange. The
inevitable presence of competition provided the guarantee that values
produced in exchange will be determined, not by individual parties
themselves, but by market forces in general. Competition’s presence
influenced and, in a sense, determined the process through which the
formation of equivalent value occurs. Still, the liberal economists of
the nineteenth century continued to view market competition as a
natural

dynamic,

requiring

nonintervention.

Whether

the

fundamental conceptual dyad of the market was exchange-equality,
as in early classical analysis, or competition-inequality, as in the
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nineteenth century, the practical implication is a policy of laissezfaire.
It was on this point that the neoliberals of the Freiburg
School articulate a radical break with earlier liberal economists.
While they, too, saw competition as the fundamental principle of the
market, they envisioned competition not as a “natural datum” but
rather as a “formal structure” which “will only appear and produce its
effects under certain conditions which have to be carefully and
artificially constructed” (Foucault 2010:120). Competition, then, was
an objective of governmental reason and practice, not a natural
phenomenon which must be left unimpeded. The mechanism of
competition, as the root principle of the market in German neoliberal
thought, was guaranteed by governmental praxis and the juridical
order. As Foucault noted, the juridical here “gives form to the
economic,” by setting the conditions in which the competitive
mechanism of the market could operate (Foucault 2010:162). The role
of government was to facilitate the market, to produce the conditions
under which the market’s basic principle, competition, could operate.
Neoliberalism should by no means be conflated with a laissez-faire
liberalism. It must be identified with “permanent vigilance, activity,
and intervention” at the level of a governmental practice whose role
was to guarantee the necessary conditions deemed optimal for a
market based on competition (Foucault 2010:132).
Because the German neoliberals emphasized a deregulated
economy, any “vigilance, activity, and intervention” on the part of the
state must not introduce constraints or regulation on the market itself,
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in the forms of “price control, support for a particular sector of the
market, systematic job creation, or public investment” (Foucault
2010:132, 139). Rather, a continuous and multilateral governmental
intervention must be directed at the antecedent conditions of the
market. In other words, intervention and regulation by the state must
be manifested in formal structures, rather than direct initiatives with
specific objectives, as in the case of a planned economy. Neoliberal
formal intervention was described by Foucault in terms of a
regulatory architecture applied to game whose outcome cannot be
known in advance. Government could not endeavor to produce
specific outcomes in specific sectors or within particular elements of
the economy. It must adopt policies which optimize the general
conditions of the free market—first among them, competition. Here,
the logic of security intersected with neoliberal governance, in
contradistinction

to

a

more

rigid

disciplinary

architecture

characteristic of state planning. Neoliberal governmentality targeted
elements outside the market, specifically those elements which
functioned as the preconditions for the market’s operation.
According to Foucault, a key objective of German neoliberal
policy was price stability, which was achieved through controls on
inflation and the rate of interest. Price stability, however, was only a
means; its end was economic growth. Economic growth as an end in
itself could be considered the objective par excellence of German
neoliberalism. Full employment, on the other hand, was not an
objective of German neoliberal policy. It had been for Keynes and his
disciples; but in the view of the German neoliberals, regulations to
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produce full employment constituted destructive interventions in the
market, subverting the mechanism of competition. In general, social
rather than economic activity became the target of governmental
intervention. For instance, agricultural production was not regulated
directly, via price controls or subsidies, but indirectly, through
security measures such as the encouragement of desirable flows of
population from one region or sector to another, the proliferation and
distribution of technical instruments and innovations, the production
of knowledge, and the organization of training. Where direct
governmental intervention in the economy itself must be light,
intervention must be dense and consistent at the level of a population
which was grasped as the market’s condition of existence.
At the level of social policy, German neoliberalism
positioned itself against all strategies, tactics, and objectives
associated with Keynesianism. As Foucault noted, Keynesian social
policy emphasized all subjects having “relatively equal access to
consumer goods” (Foucault 2010:142). This implied redistributive
measure aimed at an average deemed optimal for market consumption.
For the neoliberals of the Freiburg School, on the other hand, a social
policy which emphasized equalization undermines the mechanism of
competition which organizes the market. Further, redistributive social
policy which attempted to produce conditions of equality risks
transferring “the part of income that generates savings and investment”
to another sector of the population, to be used for consumption.
Rather than equality, inequality within acceptable parameters must be
an objective of neoliberal governmentality, since it was precisely
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inequality which sustained competition. The maximum acceptable
redistributive intervention will be the transfer of a portion of income
which would be used for “over-consumption” in one sector to
members of the population who “find themselves in a state of underconsumption” because of permanent or temporary disability
(Foucault 2010:143). Redistributive measures were in short strictly
exceptional, and an emphasis on the inequality requisite for economic
competition was pushed to the foreground.
A final exemplary feature of German neoliberal social policy
was privatization rather than socialization or collectivization of the
insurance against risk. For the economists of the Freiburg School,
social policy should above all foreground economic growth, which
would allow individuals “to achieve a level of income that will allow
them the […] individual or familial [capital] with which to absorb
risks” (Foucault 2010:144). On this view, growth would render
collectivized insurance, and social support programs more generally,
unnecessary; privatized and individualized social policy was a
cornerstone of neoliberal governmentality tout court, which in part
explained the conventional wisdom which associated neoliberalism
with “small” government. Notably, while moderate socialization of
insurance against risk has come to characterize many European liberal
democracies, the contemporary politics of the United States remained
firmly rooted in the neoliberal principle of privatized insurance
described by Foucault.
In summary, German neoliberal policy emphasized growth
through non-intervention in the market. State sovereignty was rooted
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in the economic and evaluated in economic terms. The market was
organized around the principle of competition, understood as an
artificial structure which must be maintained, rather than as a natural
force. Despite its extreme emphasis on non-intervention in the market,
neoliberalism should not be conflated with non-interventionism
generally; rather, German neoliberal governmentality—which posits
an immanent link between any sort of economic interventionist policy
and authoritarianism—targeted individuals, groups, social forces, and
resources as preconditions of the market, which must be managed
properly to foster the market’s optimal performance and growth. With
recourse to the apparatuses of security, such management was
ensured. Above all, economic growth in a competitive market would
require persistent inequality in the distribution of resources among
economic agents.
4.2. American Neoliberalism
Despite the incongruity of conditions between postwar
Germany and the postwar United States, American neoliberalism
emerged, as in Germany, in reaction to Keynesian economic policy
and the construction of a welfare state from the late 1930s through the
postwar period. To be sure, many of the features of German
neoliberalism described by Foucault approximated or were reflected
in American neoliberal reason and practice. Still, the background
conditions of American neoliberalism’s emergence differed markedly
from those present in postwar Germany: liberalism has always been
and continues to be the dominant current in American politics,
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perhaps uniquely so. In the context of the United States, Foucault
noted, “the demand for liberalism founds the state rather than the state
limiting itself through liberalism” (Foucault 2010:217). American
neoliberals clearly did not face a number of the entrenched obstacles
confronted by their German counterparts; America’s liberal heritage
in a sense eased neoliberalism’s emergence. And yet, something
historically unique was indeed achieved in the establishment of an
American neoliberal governmentality.
Foucault articulated three features of American neoliberal
reflection, which distinguished it from German neoliberalism on the
one hand and the classical liberalism endemic to American politics on
the other. These features were, respectively, the “epistemological
transformation” of the object of economic analysis, the theory of
human capital, and the generalization of the market-form (Foucault
2010:222). Discussing each of these theoretical innovations in turn,
this section highlighted those features of early American neoliberal
reason and practice which have left their mark most imperiously on
our historical present. Even when we did not call them by name, the
artifacts of neoliberalism were familiar to us: they have been
inscribed in our governmentality, embedded in our social practices,
and invested in our conduct.
American neoliberalism first established a breach with
classical economic analysis at the level of its object. We have already
seen that the principle object of German neoliberal reflection was not
the marketplace as a site of exchange but rather the mechanism of
competition, viewed as a formal structure which guaranteed the
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rationality of market activity. American neoliberals presupposed the
German conclusions concerning competition, but proposed that the
principle object of economic analysis should be neither the market as
a space nor competition as a structure, but rather the economic
decision-making processes of individuals. For the American
neoliberals, economics must concern itself with “the way in which
individuals allocate […] scarce means to alternative ends” (Foucault
2010:222). Notably, the economic decision-making which formed the
principle object of American neoliberal economic reflection may well
be irrational and must therefore be studied in its human depth and
local particularity, rather than through the construction of abstract
models and deductive reasoning. As a sort of empiricism, economics
was “no longer the analysis of the historical logic of processes,” but
is rather “the analysis of […] the strategic programming of
individuals’ activity” (Foucault 2010:223). This epistemological shift
not only marked out the analytical field of American neoliberal
thought. It represented the emergence of an entirely new economic
subject—as an object of knowledge and manipulation—which would
play a crucial role in the development of the theory of human capital.
The analysis of labor as human capital marked another major
breach with classical economic reflection. To the extent that classical
economy analyzed labor, it did so quantitatively, in terms of time. For
the classical economists, productive labor was generally expressed as
a duration of labor-time, an equation which Foucault termed the
“Ricardian reduction,” in reference to David Ricardo, the classical
theorist par excellence of labor-value (Foucault 2010:220). In the
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classical view, labor was treated rather like an abstract, homogenous
substance. If laborers were not entirely bereft of subjecthood, it was
only to the extent that they were consumers. Labor as such, no matter
how productive, was an object acted upon, and was never analyzed
from within. Marx, like Ricardo, analyzed labor in an abstract manner,
as labor-power which was forcibly reduced to a passive variable,
indeed a commodity, seized by the process of capitalist exploitation
and delivered to the mechanism of capital’s self-expansion. Even for
early twentieth-century economists, such as Keynes, labor was
figured as a passive or dependent variable of production and was
therefore subject to a given rate of capital investment. For all these
theorists, labor was fundamentally heterogenous vis-à-vis the
economic forces which acted upon it.
The American neoliberals understood the abstraction of
labor as an artifact of the analysis of labor offered by classical
economy. Abstraction was neither the universal truth of labor nor the
contingent effect of capitalist production. It was, quite simply,
symptomatic of “the way in which these processes have been
reflected in classical economics” (Foucault 2010:221). For the
American neoliberals, a new analytic must grasp labor, not simply as
an abstract force of production, but at the complex level of the human
laborer as an economic actor, endowed with drives and inclinations,
desires and interests. Labor must be analyzed in a qualitative rather
than a quantitative manner, in order to avoid the abstraction which
perturbed classical analysis. As a result, labor will no longer be
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apprehended as heterogenous vis-à-vis capital; labor was itself an
investment of a particular sort of capital—human capital.
In the theory of human capital, the act of laboring produced
an income which formed the incentive for the laboring subject to labor.
Income was not conceived as a wage, as in classical analysis, but
rather as the return on the investment of one’s time, expertise, and
body, to a given form of labor. Far from a passive subject acted upon
by capital, the laborer was him or herself capital, with the potential to
develop this capital in various ways and to various ends. Human
capital could be invested; in fact, it was always invested in one way
or another, and like all investments, this investment may be lucrative
or disadvantageous. Production no longer appeared, as it did in
classical analysis, as a meeting between an active and a passive
force—labor and capital—but as a collaboration between individuals
with human capital of greater and lesser value. As Foucault noted, in
this frame each laborer “appears as a sort of enterprise for himself”
(Foucault 2010:225). Thus, the economic subject, or homo
œconomicus, of classical liberalism—homo œconomicus as a party to
exchange—was completely replaced in American neoliberal thought
by an essentially entrepreneurial homo œconomicus. As an economic
enterprise unto herself, the laborer’s each and every move would
henceforth be an economic decision regarding her status as human
capital.
The neoliberal analysis of labor as human capital dovetailed
with the epistemological shift in the object of economic analysis,
insofar as labor was no longer analyzed as an object operated on by
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capital, but was rather an investment of human capital made by the
living laborer, an economic subject who engaged in production and
consumption for various reasons, and who above all made choices
concerning investment and expenditure of his or her time and
resources. This enormous shift—a shift which continues to define our
historical present—invested every category of social life with new
meaning: every choice concerning the self was an economic choice
which bears on the dearness of one’s self as human capital. This is, of
course, common knowledge to all of us today, whether or not we are
familiar with the theory of human capital; one of the benefits of
Foucaultian genealogy was its ability to reveal our accustomed ways
of seeing in their radical historical specificity, so we might recognize
them as strange. Education, training, health, ability, appearance and
social relations, have all been radically reconfigured as elements in
an imposing matrix of “investment” in human capital introduced by
American neoliberal reflection (Foucault 2010:229).
In his analysis of the Freiburg School, Foucault noted that
German neoliberalism instituted a “generalization of the enterprise
form,” wherein the individual was rendered a “permanent and
multiple enterprise” integrated in the social body (Foucault 2010:242,
241). This analysis resembled Foucault’s remarks on the theory of
human capital and the entrepreneurial nature of American
neoliberalism; to be sure, the American neoliberal economic subject,
as human capital, was structured as an enterprise. Still, Foucault
asserted that American neoliberalism, in the most general sense,
erected itself not through a generalization of the enterprise-form, but
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through a “generalization of the economic form of the market”
(Foucault 2010:243). This generalization was most clearly manifested
in the tendency to subject those domains traditionally thought to fall
beyond the purview of economics to economic analysis. American
neoliberal reflection found market dynamics at work in all aspects of
the social field; the market acted as the analytical paradigm through
which all social processes were apprehended, interpreted and
evaluated.
We have already seen such economic evaluation in the
government of the self as human capital. Foucault likewise noted that
a “permanent criticism” confronted all government action and public
policy with a matrix of economic cost-benefit analysis (Foucault
2010:247). As in the case of German neoliberalism, such criticism did
not furnish a laissez-faire categorical imperative for governmental
non-intervention in the market. Instead, government policy must
grasp those elements which condition the market and rigorously
organize them according to the imperative of market expansion.
Neoliberal analysis and critique of public policy furnished a
“permanent economic tribunal confronting government,” wherein
specific policies and initiatives were evaluated almost exclusively in
the terms of the market, as well as in terms of their effects on the
market (Foucault 2010:247). Public policy not only served, but
mimicked, the organization of the market.3 Social relations, too, came

3

A notable contemporary example of such mimesis was the commonplace
implementation of “cap-and-trade” carbon emissions regulations, which articulate a
“carbon market” within the market itself (see, Bailey 2007).
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to be analyzed as if they were economies, as if all behavior were
calculable in terms of cost and benefit. If American neoliberalism has
transformed economic reflection, it has equally altered political
practice and inscribed itself in our discourse.
The subjection of the personal, interpersonal, and social
fields to economic analysis in American neoliberalism was given its
most succinct and dramatic articulation by Gary Becker, an eminent
American economist and neoliberal theorist of the Chicago School.
For Becker, economic analysis could be used to analyze any
circumstance in which an “individual’s conduct […] reacts to reality
in a non-random way” (Foucault 2010:269). In Foucault’s reading of
Becker, economics could be defined “as the science of the systematic
nature of responses to environmental variables” (Foucault 2010:269).
Implicit in this assertion was a total reversal of the picture of
economic subjecthood which characterized classical economy. For
economists in the classical tradition, homo œconomicus was a subject
governed by her interests; as an agent, she must be free to pursue these
interests through her voluntary engagement in economic affairs.
Interests themselves, on this view, were as such beyond the reach of
government; in classical economy, it was precisely insofar as the
human subject is a homo œconomicus that she was beyond the reach
of government.4
4

This is not to suggest that society was uncontrolled or unmanaged in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries; on the contrary (Foucault 1979). Social forces were indeed
controlled, but this control was suffused with a different meaning: elements such as
crime, delinquency and vagabondage, if left to their own devices, would interrupt the
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For the American neoliberals, on the contrary, economic
analysis could be applied to the individual in all her decision-making
processes. These decision-making processes, insofar as they
responded to the external world and not to obscure unreachable
“interests,” could be directed and governed. The neoliberal homo
œconomicus was precisely “the person who accepts reality or who
responds systematically to modification in the variables of the
environment,” and who was therefore “eminently governable”
(Foucault 2010:270f). In American neoliberal economic reflection,
economic subjects could be effectively managed by managing the
variables which condition their interests and their decision-making
processes. Advertising, as the government of individual economic
interests, proliferated under neoliberalism. Yet such manipulation
unfolded within the frame of security: the process of “programming”
individuals in neoliberalism does not exactly correspond to an
individualized protocol. Rather, individuals appeared as members of
populations, classes, or “interest groups,” which were targeted as
general forces. Even in our society of individuals, the individual
tended to recede as the target of population management.
Where classical analysis apprehended human beings as
economic agents whose natural element was, as it were, the free
market, neoliberal economic reflection concerned itself with the
conditions which produced human beings as the sort of economic

naturalness which reigned in the market. Under neoliberalism, on the contrary, the
market is itself artificial, and social control constitutes one of its conditions of
existence.
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decision-makers they were, endowed with specific economic desires
and interests. American neoliberal reason and practice, like its
German counterpart, found its root principle in a market defined by
competition. It apprehended the totality of the social field in a manner
traditionally reserved for the market, approaching the category of
labor in a qualitative rather than a quantitative manner. It
foregrounded the concrete decision-making processes of individuals,
who appeared in economic reflection as human capital. Further,
American neoliberal reflection furnished a vision of economic
subjects as immanently governable at the level of their interests.
Foucault’s analysis powerfully demonstrated that American
neoliberalism, like its German counterpart, should not be grasped as
a simple resurgence of classical liberal themes. In a dramatic
movement, neoliberalism erected itself through a series of reversals
of classical liberal principles, while nevertheless inscribing itself
within the horizon of the eighteenth-century art of the least possible
government.
Conclusion: Living the Neoliberal Present
We no longer live in the post-Depression boom which
prompted the rise of American neoliberalism. The 1970s brought the
more or less complete liquidation of Keynesian economics, along
with a pattern of welfare-state retrenchment that extended to the
present day. Other crises have come and gone; their redress under
neoliberalism has often been as exacting and deleterious as their
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immediate effects. 5 Since Foucault’s writing, striking features of
neoliberalism have emerged which remained marginal in his account:
the proliferation of creditor-debtor relations and the ascendency of
finance capital. Yet Foucault’s analysis remains prescient. It allowed
us to see that neoliberalism was anything but a framework whose
practical implication was a policy of laissez-faire. Neoliberal
governmentality was an active governmentality, facilitating the
market by governing those forces external to it but conducive to its
stability and growth. Continuing privatization of medical care and the
insurance against risk; increased privatization in education, policing
and punishment, surveillance and defense; dependence on corporate
contracting and private partnership within those goods still held in
common: these were the policies or the effects of a governmentality
whose object was economic expansion, and whose root principles are
competition and inequality.
If neoliberal governmentality represented a dense network
of policies and tactics, as Foucault suggested, it was indeed far
removed from the laissez-faire classical governance which
confronted a market ruled by the laws of nature. But if this is so,

5

Unsurprisingly, the worst affected in the case of crisis are almost invariably those
already marginalized. To cite just two examples: losses suffered between 2008 and
2011 effectively widened the yawning wealth gap between Black and white households,
a gap which expanded in the teeth of federal initiatives intended to stabilize the
economy (Glaude 2016); what’s more, municipal debt and the curtailment of municipal
and state spending in the post-2008 United States have precipitated waves of
“extractive” policing, with disproportionate and calamitous effects on communities of
color (Wang 2018:153).
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neoliberalism was equally a network of points to which resistance
may be applied. The market unearthed by classical analysis was
defined by its inaccessibility; utilitarian reflection showed that market
intervention was futile at best. But under neoliberalism, the market’s
very existence demanded that formal structures be rigorously
maintained to ensure competition and growth. The tactics through
which neoliberalism produced and sustained such a market—the
application of security techniques, the mechanisms of privatization,
the generalization of the market-form, the government of interest and
the production of self-governing subjects as human capital— were
points of articulation that may equally be targets for tactical
intervention. Under a neoliberal governmentality, a precise
understanding of neoliberal reason and practice may enable us to
better resist the structures governing the present.
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Abstract: California is infamously known for its likelihood of
environmental hazards such as flooding, landslides, air pollution, and
forest fires which can be attributed to the natural climate of the area
as well as anthropologically influenced climate change. Air pollution
also posed potential threats and dangers to the civilians of California
as increasing populations and uses of fossil fuels continued to
contribute to the growing issue of climate change. The goal of this
study was to examine and analyze the geospatial trends environmental
hazards in California such as landslides, air pollution, flooding, and
forest fires. A weighted test, zone and slope reclassifications, and
quantified tests were conducted in order to study the effects of climate
change on risk level in California. It was found that the greatest air
quality and fire risk is located within Central Valley while fire and
landslide risk showed opposite effects. Areas of high environmental
hazard risk and low income were scattered amongst the state but
mainly concentrated in the northern and eastern areas of California.

Keywords: GIS, ArcGIS, California, flooding, landslides, air
pollution, wildfires, income, risk assessment, satellite
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Introduction
California has been infamously known for its likelihood of
environmental hazards such as flooding, landslides, air pollution, and
forest fires which could be attributed to the natural climate of the area
as well as anthropologically influenced climate change (Adams et al.
2014; Harris 2017; Montgomery 2018; Hanson 2018). Air pollution
also posed potential threats and dangers to the civilians of California
as increasing populations and uses of fossil fuels continued to
contribute to the growing issue of climate change (Benmarhnia 2017).
Climate change additionally worsens air pollution, as ground-level
ozone (O3) formed through reactions from sunlight and other air
pollutants such as nitrous oxides. Ozone formation further accelerated
under higher temperatures as well (Allen 2014). The effects of climate
change that lead to dangerous natural events such as wildfires in
California oftentimes created positive feedback loops that led to
worsened conditions such as drought or inundation depending on
regional circumstances (Barnard et al. 2018). Exposure to
environmental disasters was also found to increase risk for long-term
mental health disorders such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and major depression (Lowe et al. 2015). Evidence suggested
that lower income areas may be purposefully placed in locations that
exposed them to more environmental disasters as well as lower air
quality due to factors like environmental racism and a lack of political
change (ESRI and Geiling 2015).
The goal of this study was to examine and analyze the
geospatial trends of environmental hazards in California such as
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landslides, air pollution, flooding, and forest fires. We also compared
the risk of these hazards to average income within California census
tracts. Two research questions were inquired in this study: Where in
California were people exposed to more environmental hazards?
Additionally, were California areas with lower overall annual income
more exposed to environmental hazards?
Methods
In order to analyze risk of environmental hazards in
California on a census-tract scale, we followed modified methods of
Carver, Tricker, and Landres (2013) by creating ranks and weights of
qualities to create a visual representation of a certain characteristics
of the environment. In order to get a holistic perspective of
environmental hazard risk, we quantified the risk of air pollution
(specifically ozone and particulate matter) exposure, landslides,
flooding, and fire by assigning specific properties of the hazards a
risk-ranking from 0 (smallest risk) to 4 (highest risk). To finalize
overall hazards risk, we did a weighted overlay analysis, combining
the four environmental hazards. Finally, we compared individual and
overall environmental hazards risk to income to determine if there
was a relationship between risk and income.
To quantify flood risk, we reclassified the flood zones of
California and assigned them a risk-ranking from 0 to 4 (Table 2). For
the fire quality, we directly used the fire threat raster from the
California Fire Resource Assessment Program (FRAP) that was
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already classified into five classes based on severity of fire threat
(Table 3).
To quantify landslide risk, we first reclassified the slope of
California into a risk ranking (Table 4). To account for the influence
of soil compaction and stability, we reclassified each land
classification in the National Land Cover Database into five classes
(Table 5). Because wildfires loosen soil and increase landslide risk
(Montgomery 2018), we used the overall fire risk as a quality of
landslide risk. To generate a holistic landslide risk character, we
conducted a weighted overlay analysis, giving both slope and fire risk
a weight of 40%, because a landslide is dependent on slope and fires
can significantly increase landslide chances. We gave land cover a
weight of 20%.
To quantify risk to exposure of air pollution in California,
we quantified the risk of exposure to both ozone and particulate
matter PM2.5 microns. Ozone and particle pollution were selected as
the two indicators of exposure to air pollution due to their direct and
severe effects on human health: ground-level ozone can lead to
respiratory deficiency and asthma while particulate matter can cause
an increase in heart attacks along with other decreased lung functions
(Environmental Protection Agency 2018). We assigned both ozone
and PM2.5 a risk-ranking based on the amount of each in a daily
maximum 8-hour period (Table 6; Table 7). We then conducted a
weighted overlay analysis of these two pollutants, giving each equal
ranking (50%) due to their high cost to human health.
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To quantify the overall risk of environmental hazards in
California, we conducted a weighted overlay analysis of all four
environmental hazards. Specifically, we gave fire risk a weight of
30% because of the high wildfire frequency of California and flood
hazard a weight of 20% because the semi-arid climate results in little
precipitation to cause much flooding (Barnard et al. 2018).
Meanwhile, we assigned both landslide risk and air pollution risk a
ranking of 25%, as they are subject to change but still have a rather
impactful influence on the natural disasters that could occur within a
given area (Barnard et al. 2018).
In order to analyze the relationship between socioeconomic
class and environmental hazards exposure risk, we used GeoDa to
generate a standardized scatterplot of income versus overall natural
hazards risk within the California census tracts. We selected the
census tracts with both average to below-average income and average
to above-average natural hazards risk so to evaluate spatial
distribution of higher risk, poorer areas. We also created scatterplots
of each of the four individual environmental hazards in comparison
to income to closely analyze any possible correlations between each
of the hazards to income that may affect the overall relationship.
Results
The severity of flood risk varied throughout California, as
the greatest amount of risk lies along a vertical medial line of the state
from the city of Red Bluff to Rosamond within Central Valley. The
lowest areas of flood risk tended to cluster together such as the
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southeastern region of California as well as several areas along the
northern and eastern part of the state (Figure 1a.). Areas around the
Central Valley between Red Bluff and Rosamond as well as part of
southeastern California were least likely to be impacted by landslides
and fires (Figure 1b., 1c.). The greatest air quality risk was located
within Central Valley and the amount of risk gradually decreased in
adjacent areas (Figure 1d.).
In regard to overall environmental hazard risks, the areas of
the lowest amount of risk included regions of southwestern California
and a small number of northern areas at the northern end of Central
Valley (Figure 2). The eastern edge of the valley and the southern
areas of the state had the highest overall natural hazard risks (Figure
2). There was not a clear spatial pattern of census tracts with average
to above-average risk and average to below-average income (Figure
3). There was not a clear relationship between any individual
environmental hazard risk and income (Figure 4). There was also not
a clear relationship between overall environmental hazard risk and
income (Figure 5).
Discussion
Flood risk and air pollution risk were highest around the
Central Valley region (Figure 1a., 1d). Fire risk and landslide risk
were lowest in this region (Figure 1b., 1c.). Overall, the areas in
California with the highest natural hazard risk bordered the Central
Valley region (Figure 2). There was not a clear relationship between
income and any or overall natural hazard risk (Figure 4, Figure 5).
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There did not appear to be a clear spatial pattern of areas with average
to above-average hazards risk and average to below-average income
(Figure 3).
Our results could be generally explained by the topography
of the region. The Central Valley, for example, would have had a high
flood risk due to its flat elevation (California Physical Map 2018). Its
flat elevation also explained the low landslide risk. Additionally, the
Central Valley was quite developed, minimizing the number of shrubs,
trees, and grasslands that could have otherwise had high fire risk
(Hanson 2018). In contrast, high fire risk areas were composed of
more grasslands and shrubs that caused a positive feedback event of
wildfires (Hanson 2018). Finally, the mountains surrounding the
Central Valley could trap ground-level ozone and PM2.5 within its
borders. (Irceline 2018). There was less air pollution risk along the
western coast due to the strength and high frequency of coastal winds
which pushed air pollution eastbound (Adams et al. 2014). In
reference to overall risk, the relatively higher weight of fire risk
(30%) and relatively lower weight of flooding (20%), may explain the
high risk in the areas surrounding the central valley and the low risk
within it. With landslide risk also incorporating fire risk, fire risk
significantly impacted overall natural hazard risk.
Our overall results were not supported by previous studies.
One study by Bolin, Boone, and Grineski (2015) found that affluent
populations were oftentimes more exposed to certain natural hazards,
such as flooding, as affluent populations could afford insurance to
mitigate the risks while enjoying and affording the luxuries associated
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with water-front property. The study also found that less affluent
populations often resided near areas with high air pollution, as there
is not any insurance that could mitigate the costs of this hazard (Bolin
et al. 2015). Several other studies have found that lower-income
communities were more exposed to air pollution, although other
factors such as race also play a role in distribution (Brulle and Pellow
2006; Marshall 2008; Clark et al. 2014).
Our study is important because it allows local governments
to better prepare and mitigate environmental hazards. It is important
to understand the geographic trends of environmental hazards in order
to utilize the proper, necessary resources to help high-risk
communities. This study was not without limitations. For one, we had
to give a ranking of 0 (lowest risk) for areas with no data (such as
areas with undetermined flood zones). Additionally, we had to
simplify the criteria of risk for each natural hazard as there are an
immeasurable number of factors that could influence flooding,
landslides, and fires. However, in order to quantify the complexity of
these hazards, we had to simplify the factors.
To further this study, further research should include an indepth analysis into how varying the weights when quantifying
individual natural hazards risk (such as flooding) as well as when
quantifying the total environmental hazard risk in California will
impact the findings. Further research should also incorporate
additional environmental hazards, such as drought, to expand upon
the current results. It would also be valuable to assess the relationship
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of risk to natural hazards with other socioeconomic factors, such as
race.
Figures and Tables
Table 1. Data sources
Name

Who Created

Time Valid

Description

National
Flood Hazard
Layer
California
Air Pollution
2018

FEMA

2018

Office of
Environmental
Health and
Hazard
Assessment

2018

National
Land Cover
Database
2011
Fire Threat in
California

USGS

2011

Shapefile of flood data for
California, including flood
zones
Shapefile of California
with data of air pollution
exposure (including but
not limited to ozone and
particulate matter 2.5),
respiratory health diseases,
and income
Raster of the land use types
in California

State of California
Fire Resource and
Assessment
Program (FRAP)
State of California

2005

Data Basin- from
NASA and NGA
data

2000

California
90m DEMTiles

USGS

2013

California
Census
Tracts

American Fast
Finder

2012-2016

California
Census
Tracts
Shapefile

US Census
Bureau

2010

California
Shapefile
California
90m DEM

2018
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Raster of fire risk in
California. Created by
combining fire frequency
and potential fire behavior.
Shapefile of the state of
California
(An incomplete) Digital
Elevation Model of
California at 90-meter
resolution
Tiles of California and
Arizona Digital Elevation
Models to complete the
California DEM
Table of census data for
census tracts of California,
including but not limited to
income data.
Shapefile of California
census tracts

Table 2. Rationale for Reclassified Flooding Ranking (Second Look
Flood, N.d.)
Flood Zone

Rank

Reason

“Area not included”; “D”

0

“D” rankings are possible but undetermined
flood hazard areas.

“X”

1

Area of minimal or moderate flood hazard

“A”; “A99”; “AE”;
“AH”; “Open Water”

2

Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding or
areas where clear base flood elevations

“AO”

3

Area with a 1% or greater chance of flooding
each years with an average depth of 1-3 feet

“V”; “VE”

4

High risk coastal areas

Table 3. FRAP Fire Threat Rankings
FRAP Value

Our Rank

Definition

-1

0

Little to No Threat

1

1

Moderate

2

2

High

3

3

Very High

4

4

Extreme
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Table 4. Rationale for Reclassified Slope Ranking (Clark et al.
2018)
Slope
Degrees

Rank

0-1
1-10

0
1

10-20

2

20-40

3

40-83

4

Reason
Need some slope in order for a landslide to occur
Steep slopes not a necessary prerequisite for landslides to
occur. Gentle slopes at 1–2 degrees can also cause
landslides
Increasing slope allows for greater chance of mass
wasting
Major landslides are often associated with slopes from 2040 degrees
Extremely steep

Table 5. Rationale for Reclassified Land Cover Ranking
(Montgomery 2018)
Land Cover
Open water
Woody Wetlands
Perennial Snow/Ice
Deciduous forest;
Emergent herbaceous
wetlands;
Evergreen forest;
Mixed forest
Shrub/scrub;
Developed High
Intensity
Cultivated Crops;
Pasture/Hay;
Developed Medium
Intensity; Herbaceous
Developed Open
Space;
Low Intensity;
Barren Land;
Unclassified

Rank

Reason

0

Open water. High tree density in woody
wetlands. Overall little soil to mass waste.

1

High tree density keeps soils compact and
prevents mass wasting

2

Shrub/scrub has some roots to stabilize soils;
Little soil to mass waste in highly developed
areas
Herbaceous, Cultivated crops, and pasture/hay
lands have little roots to stabilize soils; A little bit
of soil to mass waste in medium

3

4

Developed Open Space, Low Intensity, and
Barren land have little to no roots or structures to
compact and stabilize soils.
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Table 6. Rationale for Reclassified Ozone Ranking* (ESRI and
Geiling 2015)
Ozone (ppm)

Rank

Reason

0.026- 0.34

0

Equal interval division rounded based on EPA
standard of 0.070 as acceptable ozone level,
noticeable amounts and respiratory effects, painless

0.3401 - 0.043

1

0.04301- 0.051

2

0.05101 - 0.060
0.0601- 0.068

3
4

Uncomfortable patterns of breathing in some
individuals
Coughing and throat irritation, more frequent
episodes of coughing
Chest pain, coughing, shortness of breath
Meets upper end of EPA standard - chest pain,
intense coughing, difficulty breathing for individuals
both with and without asthma

*Based on the amount of each in a daily maximum 8-hour period

Table 7. Rationale for Reclassified Particulate Matter (PM2.5)
Ranking* (EPA 2018)
PM
0 - 3.92

Rank
0

Reason

Equal interval division rounded based on range of
0-19.60 PM2.5 annually in California using 7.89
CA state average- particles linger in atmosphere
and are breathed into lungs
3.9201 - 7.84
Slightly more acidic waters and possible irritation
1
of throat and eyes
7.8401 - 11.76
Acidic waters and hazy air, depletes nutrients in
2
soil
11.7601 - 15.68
Exertion experienced by sensitive individuals with
3
increased possibilities of the following: nonfatal
heart attacks, irregular heartbeat, aggravated
asthma, decreased lung function, increased
respiratory symptoms
15.6801 - 19.60
Lack of oxygen intake along with nonfatal heart
4
attacks, irregular heartbeat, aggravated asthma,
decreased lung function, increased respiratory
symptoms, and premature death
*Based on the amount of each in a daily maximum 8-hour period
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Figure 1. Four Risks of Environmental Hazards in California
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Figure 2. Overall Natural Hazard Risks in California
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Figure 3. Overall High Environmental Hazard Risks Areas with
Low Income in California
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Figure 4. Scatterplots of Relationship Between Income and the Four
Environmental Hazard Risks of Flood, Fire, Landslide, and Air
Pollution.
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Figure 5. Scatterplot of Relationship Between Income and Overall
Natural Hazard Risk from Flooding, Fires, Landslides, and Air
Pollution.
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Abstract: In considering the nexus between law, religion, and settler
colonialism, I considered a case in which an Indigenous freedom of
religion claim under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms was ruled by the majority of Supreme Court of Canada
as not being a valid freedom of religion claim. In examining this
decision, I constructed an analytical framework through which I
examined the decision in a way that considered the legal system in
which it occurred, that legal system’s culture, and the relevance of
land in this case. Using this analytical framework, I teased out why
the Ktunaxa decision occurred in the way that it did, drawing on the
discourse of both the majority and concurring arguments. I argued
that the Supreme Court of Canada restricting what may validly be
claimed as an infringement on the Charter’s guarantee to freedom of
religion was an example of continuing settler colonialism that occurs
within a political culture that, superficially, placed great emphasis on
reconciliation with the Indigenous peoples that resided within its
political-geographical confines.

Keywords: religious freedom, Indigenous people, Ktunaxa v. British
Columbia, land, legal culture, Canada
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Introduction
By considering the nexus between law, religion, and settler
colonialism, this paper embarked on an analysis of Ktunaxa Nation v.
British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations),
hereafter “Ktunaxa.” Ktunaxa was a case brought on by Indigenous
peoples contesting a freedom of religion claim under section 2(a) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This claim, however,
was ruled by the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada as not
infringing on the Ktunaxa Nation’s freedom of religion. In examining
this Supreme Court decision, the motivations of this paper were
twofold. The first was to construct an analytical framework through
which I examined Ktunaxa in a way that considered the legal system
in which it occurred, that legal system’s culture, and the relevance of
land in this case. Second, using this analytical framework, I teased out
why the Ktunaxa decision occurred in the way that it did, drawing on
the discourse of both the majority and concurring arguments. In doing
so, I argued that the Supreme Court’s decision of what may validly
be claimed as an infringement on the Charter’s guarantee to freedom
of religion reflected a legal system that divides suffering into that
which was socially acceptable and that which was not; a process that
reflected dominant social and legal cultural beliefs and values. In light
of this, I also argued that the expansive approach taken by the Court
to freedom of religion in Amselem v. Syndicat Northcrest should not
be restrained. These were relevant conclusions for a multitude of
reasons. Beyond exposing how the machinations of the Canadian
legal system produced this decision, it also spoke more broadly about
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Canadian political culture. Though I did not discuss this in detail in
this paper, this case provided an example of continuing settler
colonialism that occurred within a political culture that, superficially,
placed great emphasis on reconciliation with the Indigenous peoples
that reside within its geopolitical confines.
Ktunaxa v. British Columbia: A Case Brief
Due to lengthy history of Ktunaxa, I have not recounted
every detail of the case but rather provided an overview of the key
components. According to the Supreme Court, the basic issues
regarding the case, at paragraph 57, are as follows: 1) did British
Columbia’s Minister of Forests’ decision to allow the Jumbo Valley
Ski Hill development infringe upon the Ktunaxa’s section 2(a)
freedom of religion and conscience?; and 2) did the Minister’s
consultation with the Ktunaxa meet the requirements of s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982?6
The decision of the majority, at paragraph 75, found that the
Ktunaxa’s claim did not fall within the scope of section 2(a) of the
Charter. Further, at paragraph 115, the Court found that the
Minister’s consultation efforts with the Ktunaxa were not
unreasonable. The minority, led by Mr. Justice Moldaver, concurred
in part with the majority, but found that the Ktunaxa did have a valid
freedom of religion claim under section 2(a) of the Charter, but that

6

Section 35 states that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
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this claim was justifiably infringed upon under section (1) of the
Charter, which allowed for infringements of rights and freedoms in
such a way that was justifiable in a free and democratic society.
Constructing a Theoretical Framework
Before considering Ktunaxa itself, I have laid out the
analytic means through which the case was analyzed. I accomplished
this by conducting a review of relevant literature on the legal system
itself, the act of “law doing,” and the importance of land in this case.
In doing so, I created a means by which to analyze the Court’s holding
and ratio in Ktunaxa and examine the implications of how the
decision was reasoned. This was not for the purpose of determining
what is the right or wrong way to conduct an analysis in this case but,
rather, to tease out why the ruling occurred as it did.
To determine the court’s reasoning, I selected the following
academic sources from the literature, which I briefly preface here. In
my review of the literature, I took a top-down approach, beginning
with the legal system as a whole and narrowing my analytic focus as
I moved through sources. As such, I began with Louis Wolcher’s
(2006) conceptualization of the legal system as one that produced a
“Universal Human Suffering” and in which suffering was divided into
that which is just, and that which is unjust. Having situated those
reading this paper in “the ultimate goal” of our legal system and
considered the unintended consequences of how it operates, I next
considered an article titled “Racism and the Innocence of Law,” by
Patrick Fitzgerald (1987). Fitzgerald (1987) analyzed the Western
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liberal legal system itself and considered the unintended
reproductions of racism and inequality through its reliance on
presuppositions of equality and individualism. Following this, I
considered how the legal system itself constructed religion within its
confines, drawing on the writings of Benjamin Berger (2010). Finally,
I considered the issue of land, which was at the heart of Ktunaxa, by
examining conceptualizations of ongoing colonization and how land
was at “the crux” of this process.
In concluding this section, I drew upon these modes of
analysis and unified them into a single paradigmatic model through
which I was able to embark upon an analysis of Ktunaxa itself. In
doing so, I recognized the risk of flattening the deep and insightful
works of the theorists that I have mentioned. However, I hoped to
preserve the essential qualities of the works that I drew upon in my
analytical model to fully capture what it is to “do law” in the context
of Ktunaxa.
“Law-Doing” and the Division of Sorrows
In his article, Wolcher (2006:364) puts forth a model of
“Universal Human Suffering,” pictured below:
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While Wolcher (2006) spoke in his article about Universal
Human Suffering, specifically regarding human rights, this mode of
analysis has been adapted to cases7 concerning Indigenous issues in
Canada. I would here like to focus on the suffering identified as
“Rejected by Law as a Basis for Legal Remediation” in Wolcher’s
(2006) typology. Wolcher (2006:393) said that “[l]aw-doers divide
people's suffering into two parts: suffering that is regarded as socially
acceptable and suffering that is not.” He expanded on this central
tenet of his essay by explaining that only those whose suffering was
recognised by law-doers have the right to have their suffering taken
seriously (Wolcher 2006:393).
In creating this distinction, Wolcher (2006:361) was
answering his own guiding question: “what is the ultimate task of the
law.” This was an important conclusion to consider in this paper and
beyond, but it also put forth the question: what is the nexus between
law and society’s dominant cultural norms that created such a division

7

See Hadley Friedland’s “Tragic Choices and the Division of Sorrows.”
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of suffering? In order to answer this question, I considered the
“culture” of the legal community and law itself in the next two articles.
The Liberal Legal System and the Reproduction of Racism
In his article, Fitzgerald told us that “[i]n liberal views of the
world, law is manifestly incompatible with racism” (1987:119), and
that “[l]aw is radically separate from 'material life'” (1987:121).
Fitzgerald (1987:121) went on to say that self-interest, in a liberal
system of law, must be constrained by universalistic legal and
motivational structures. Setting aside for a moment the liberal legal
system as a reproducer of racism, this act of situating his article within
this perception was important. By doing so, Fitzgerald (1987) was
pointing out a paradox within liberal legal systems: that despite
discourses of universalism, equality under the law, and even a direct
incompatibility with racism, law could and did reproduce racism. It
was for this reason that the discourse of judicial decision makers
became important, as it allowed for the breaking down and teasing
out of racism. While such racism may not be intended, it was then of
even greater importance to unmask these unintended and racist
consequences of law doing.
In considering “what” racism was in liberal and legal terms,
Fitzgerald (1987:123-124) conceptualized racism as the “intentional
wrongdoing inflicted by one individual on another.” Through his
examination of the British Race Relations Act of 1976, Fitzgerald
(1987:122) contended that “positive law acquires identity by taking
elements of racism into itself and shaping them in its own terms.” In
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his analysis of adjudications made under that Act, Fitzgerald
(1987:128) stated that “[j]udges relate to the overall ordering ethos of
community in such ultimate and revealing terms as what is ‘sensible’
and ‘reasonable,’ what conforms to ‘the fitness of things’ and to
‘common sense.’” It was in this way that a universalistic system that
operated on the foundation of equality of the individual was
constrained: in the adjudication of disputes on the legal community’s
ethos of what conforms to the “fitness of things.”
To, perhaps, dilute Fitzgerald’s (1987) argument into a form
suitable for this paper, the adjudication of disputes, even when
concerning legislation with the express interest of combating racism,
took into itself racism in that decisions were made on the basis of the
perceptions of the adjudicators. This has the effect, as Fitzgerald
(1987:131) noted, of reflecting the community of law’s evocation and
reliance on a “racially-conceived society and nation.”
Constitutional Horizons: Law’s Religion
In the context of “law’s religion,” Berger (2010:35)
conceptualized “constitutional horizons” as the means by which a
concept (such as religion) was processed. For Berger (2010:35), these
means

were

the

values

and

assumptions

of

Canadian

constitutionalism. In this way, Berger (2010:35-36) understood “that
religion never appears to the law on its own cultural terms but, rather,
is always rendered through the lens of the culture of the constitutional
rule of law.” Expanding upon this, Berger (2010:36) contended that
in this culturally defined conception of religion, it attracted the
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protection of the law under certain conditions, those being that a
religious claim concerns a private belief that impacts the autonomy
and choice of individuals.
This answers the question that I posed in the section
considering Wolcher’s (2006) Universal Human Suffering theory
concerning a nexus between law and culture in the division of
suffering. This also expanded upon such an idea in a uniquely
Canadian and religious context, by relating what form of law’s
religion attracts legal protection in the case Alberta v. Hutterian
Brethren of Wilson Colony. In doing so, Berger (2010:36) said that
“the Court cements the centrality of choice in the logic of the
constitutional protection of religion.” Berger’s analysis of culture’s
law was thus two pronged. First, law processed concepts (including
religion) through the values, assumptions, and meaning giving of
Canadian constitutionalism. Second, and in light of the first prong,
religious claims in particular focused on the individualistic and
agency-oriented idea of choice: that if a person is able to choose to
believe and manifest that belief, freedom of religion has been afforded
to that individual or collective of individuals.
The Importance of the (Settler Colonial) Construct of Land
Land has long been recognized as central to the process of
colonization. Joyce Green, an Indigenous political scientist, noted
that colonization was a two-part process. It consisted of the physical
occupation

of

someone

else’s

land,

while

simultaneously

appropriating political authority, cultural self-determination, and
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economic capacity (Green, 2003:52). Likewise, in an editorial on
Settler Colonial Studies, Rowe and Tuck (2017:5) explained the
significance of land in relation to colonialism in saying the following:
Land is at the crux of the relationships between
Indigenous peoples and settlers in settler societies.
Ongoing occupation and settler pursuits of land are
often made natural, logical, or invisible in settler
societies. Settler societies often regard land only in the
constructs of property or natural resource. Indigenous
understandings of land predate and have codeveloped
alongside and in spite of settler constructions of
property. For Indigenous societies, land is peoplehood,
relational, cosmological, and epistemological. Land is
memory, land is curriculum, land is language. “Land”
also refers to water, sky, underground, sea.
Two things were apparent in this conceptualization of land. First,
there

was

a

disconnect

between

settler

and

Indigenous

conceptualizations of land. Second, land clearly permeated the settlerIndigenous relationship. Though this paper focuses on the religious
freedom aspect of the Ktunaxa decision, land was both inextricably
linked to the settler-Indigenous relationship and was an issue before
the Supreme Court in this case. While the Court separated the issues
into two distinct analyses, they were intertwined, and land became a
consideration in the making of a religious claim.
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A Paradigm to Analyze Ktunaxa
In combining the analytical frameworks above I was, again,
cognizant of the dangers of flattening the work done by scholars in
order to create a unified means of analysis for this case. In my review
of literature, I began with Wolcher’s (2006) Universal Human
Suffering: suffering is divided into that which is societally acceptable
and that which is not. Following this, I examined Fitzgerald’s (1987)
“Innocence of Law,” in which Fitzgerald (1987) concluded that
adjudicators practice law in a way that reflected the way adjudicators
think things ought to be and, in doing so, adopted racism into law’s
identity. I then considered Berger’s (2010) constitutional horizon
theory in which religion was defined on the basis of cultural values,
assumptions, and the meaning-giving of Canadian constitutionalism.
Finally, in considering land and processes of colonization, I found
that land is at the crux of the settler-Indigenous relationship and
permeated said relationship.
In combining the above, I seek to provide myself with a
guiding question by which I will analyze Ktunaxa: considering that
law divided suffering into that which is socially acceptable and that
which is not, what are the values, assumptions, and constitutional
cultures that inform the Supreme Court’s decision in this case and,
specifically, what impact does the status of land as property have on
the Court’s decision?

77

Ktunaxa v. British Columbia: Analysis
In answering this question, I first considered the values,
assumptions, and constitutional culture that informed the Court’s
decision-making process. On the basis of this, I made a conclusion as
to what “religion” and, therefore, what “suffering” the Court reasoned
was (un)just. It was at this point that I analyzed, specifically,
comments made by Moldaver J in his concurring opinion regarding
land and property.
Constitutional Values, Meanings, and Cultures
In Berger’s (2010) article on section 1 analyzes, he
considered comments made by McLachlin CJ in her opinion in
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony. While Berger’s
(2010) analysis was made specifically in relation to section 1 analyses,
I believe that the comment of McLachlin CJ spoke to the Court’s
broader interpretational culture. Berger (2010:36) pointed out that
McLachlin CJ, at paragraph 88, listed various Charter “values,”
among which the most important value was liberty: that one can make
a choice. This was also reflected in the majority’s writing in Ktunaxa.
In applying case law on freedom of religion to Ktunaxa, the majority
stated, at paragraph 68, that an applicant must first demonstrate
sincere belief in a religious practice, and second that state conduct
interfered with the applicant’s ability to believe or manifest belief in
that practice in a manner that was not trivial or insubstantial (Ktunaxa
v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource
Operations), 2017).
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In holding that the Ktunaxa Nation’s claim did not trigger
section 2(a), the majority wrote at paragraph 70 that an “objective
analysis of the interference caused by the impugned state action” must
be conducted and that “the Minister’s decision does [not interfere
with the Ktunaxa’s ability to believe in the Grizzly Bear Spirit or
manifest that belief]” (Ktunaxa v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands
and Natural Resource Operations), 2017). In making such an analysis,
the Court was essentially duplicating what it did in Hutterian
Brethren. In Ktunaxa, the impugned state action did not manifestly
interfere with the Ktunaxa Nation’s ability to choose to believe or
manifest belief in the Grizzly Bear Spirit. What it did do, however,
was make such belief devoid of any subjective meaning, as Moldaver
J pointed out at paragraph 133:
If the Ktunaxa’s religious beliefs in Grizzly Bear Spirit
become entirely devoid of religious significance, their
prayers, ceremonies and rituals in recognition of
Grizzly Bear Spirit would become nothing more than
empty words and hollow gestures. There would be no
reason for them to continue engaging in these acts, as
they would be devoid of any spiritual significance
(Ktunaxa v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and
Natural Resource Operations), 2017).
The different opinions of the majority and Moldaver J highlighted a
cultural rift in the Court that concerned the legal processing and
construction of religion. Whereas the majority focused solely on the
agency of individuals to believe and manifest belief in determining if
a claim triggered section 2(a), Moldaver J considered the subjective
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experiences of the individuals who lived this religion in that if the
Grizzly Bear was no longer present, their beliefs and practices became
“devoid of any spiritual significance.”
Land as Private Property
Though I had no way to determine the personal beliefs of the
justices in the majority, it may also have been possible that broader
cultural values informed their section 2(a) analysis. As noted in the
section on the importance of land in this paper, “[f]or Indigenous
societies, land is peoplehood, relational, cosmological, and
epistemological. Land is memory, land is curriculum, land is
language,” while, generally speaking, settlers conceptualise land as
property and natural resources (Rowe and Tuck 2017:5). This settler
conceptualization of land was even foregrounded in the analysis of
Moldaver J under the Doré framework. In considering whether or not
the State’s infringement of the Ktunaxa Nation’s freedom of religion,
Moldaver J balanced granting the Ktunaxa the ability to effectively
veto land developments versus their religious beliefs. It was not the
objective of this paper to take a normative stance regarding the Doré
analysis of Moldaver J, I instead wished to consider what was
happening here more broadly.
In

essence,

at

issue

here

was

the

conflicting

conceptualizations of property. In the analysis of Moldaver J, primacy
was given to the settler conceptualization of land as property rather
than that of something inextricably linked to religion. This was
explicitly justified by the statement that a veto over the development
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“gives the Ktunaxa the power to exclude others from developing land
that the public in fact owns,” at paragraph 150 (Ktunaxa v. British
Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017).
It was important to remember at this point, that despite there being no
proven claim, the land on which the development was proposed was
unceded territory. This paper made no determination as to whether or
not this fact should give the Ktunaxa an effective veto over
developments, however, the conceptualization by Moldaver J of
unceded land as something that the public owns was certainly
illuminating in considering the importance of land in this decision.
The Innocent Legal System and Universal Human Suffering
In his article, Fitzgerald (1987:131) stated that adjudicators
evoke and rely on a “racially-conceived society and nation” in making
decisions. I think, in considering the writing of Berger (2010), that
this can be expanded beyond Fitzgerald’s (1987) contextual analysis.
As I have highlighted in the previous sections on Ktunaxa, legal
decisions makers do not merely rely on racial conceptions of society
and nation, they relied on dominant conceptions of society and nation,
such as religion and land in this case. It was here that legal decision
makers processed religion and land “through the values, assumptions
and meaning-giving horizon of Canadian constitutionalism” (Berger
2010:35) and, as a result, suffering was divided into that which is
justified and that which is not.
In Ktunaxa, this means that not only is the Ktunaxa Nation
was denied legal remedy, but they were further denied recognition
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that a valid religious claim even exists. This relegated their suffering
to the sphere of suffering that was not recognized by society. While
this may not have a practical impact in that infringements could still
be justified under section 1 of the Charter, it certainly has a discursive
impact in that the Ktunaxa were not only denied legal remedy, they
were told that one did not exist because of an incompatibility between
the means by which their belief was manifested and Canadian law’s
construction of religion as one that was concerned with agency, not
subjective practice.
Implications and Conclusion
Berger (2010:31) metaphorically related legal systems to
balloons in his article on section 1 analyses: “[l]egal systems are like
softly inflated balloons: if you squeeze on one side, you can expect a
bulge elsewhere.” This applied to religious freedom claims in the
Canadian context in that if many claims pass the section 2(a) test for
religious freedom claims, the analytical burden was placed upon
section 1 of the Charter. It is because of my analysis of Ktunaxa in
this paper and the reasons detailed here that I disagreed with the
notion that placing the analytical burden on section 1 created a
process that was excessively nebulous.
As has been shown throughout this paper and specifically in
the case of Ktunaxa, since the ultimate goal of legal systems was to
divide sorrows into those which are socially acceptable and those
which are not, and since this process was informed by the legal and
broader culture of society, restricting the ability of Indigenous
82

peoples to make claims under section 2(a) represents what dominant
Canadian culture considers religion, thereby excluding claims that do
not conform to that view. I argued that at the very least, in discursive
sense, a broad and expansive section 2(a) analysis was required.
While I recognised that the same dominant cultural understandings of
legal issues may impact analyses under section 1, in such a case, at
least there is a recognition that there was a valid claim and
infringement by state action. In the aftermath of the Ktunaxa decision,
Ktunaxa Nation Council Chair Kathryn Teneese relayed that “the
decision leads First Nations people to feel they are ‘less than’ others
in their rights and beliefs” (Harris 2017). While, as in the concurring
opinion of Moldaver J, the Court may have held that the Ktunaxa’s
religious freedom was proportionately balanced with the statutory
objectives that guided the development approval process, at least
discursively the Ktunaxa would have had their religious freedom
claim legitimated.
The importance of judicial discourse, particularly at the level
of the Supreme Court of Canada, was recognized by Emmett
MacFarlane in his dissertation on the Supreme Court. MacFarlane
(2009:3) asserted that “judicial pronouncements on Charter rights …
play a prominent role in shaping discourse around rights.” If Canada’s
highest court could not recognize the suffering experience by the
Ktunaxa peoples, we could not rely on this court to further
reconciliation between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. While it
might be argued that this essay nitpicks technical aspect of the Court’s
decision, as MacFarlane (2009) posited, what our courts say about
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rights influences our discussion of rights and therefore our discussion
of who has the right to have their suffering recognized and who does
not. This fact was of the utmost importance to reconciliation because
not only does the Crown-Indigenous relationship need repair, but so
to our relations as various peoples coexisting on the land, however it
may be conceptualized in our respective ontologies.
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